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TAX LAW-Tribal Taxation and Allotted Lands:

Mustang Production Company v. Harrison
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mustang Production Co. v. Harrison,' the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that the Cheyenne-Arapah0 Tribes have the authority to impose a
severance tax on oil and gas production occurring on allotted lands.2 In addition,
the court reaffirmed that such lands constitute "Indian country, 3 over which
tribes have civil jurisdiction. Before Mustang Production,the federal courts had
not established whether an Indian tribe could tax economic activity on allotted
lands, including allotted lands not located within the boundaries of a formal
reservation.5 Mustang Production is significant for New Mexico because there
are several Indian tribes with allotted lands present within the state. This Note
provides an overview of the history and rationale of Mustang Production and
explores the implications of the decision for Indian tribes located in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1988, the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes (Tribes) enacted the General Revenue
and Taxation Act, which included an oil and gas severance tax assessed at 7.085
percent of the gross market value of oil and gas produced within the Tribes'

1. 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997).
2. See id. at 1386. From 1885 to 1934, the federal government pursued a policy of assimilating Indians
into the mainstream, using the "allotment" of reservation lands in severalty as its primary weapon. See Judith
V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7-18 (1995). The federal government adopted the
General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1994) (originally enacted
as Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)) (also known as the Dawes Act), to formalize the allotment
process. Under the General Allotment Act, tribal members received a certain acreage in fee simple to own and
cultivate. See Royster, supra, at 9-10. The titles to the allotted lands were held in trust by the federal
government for twenty-five years, at the end of which time the allottees would receive a fee patent to the land.
See id. at 10 (citing General Allotment Act. 25 U.S.C. § 348). However, due to numerous problems, see id. at
10-16, the federal government later extended the trust period of the allotments in perpetuity. See id at 16-18.
3. See Mustang Prod, 94 F.3d at 1385 (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S.
114, 123 (1993)). "Indian country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. section 1151 (1994) as "(a) all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation; (b) all dependent Indian communities
.. ; and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian tidies to which have not been extinguished ....
Although the
Indian country statute is codified under the criminal code, the United States Supreme Court has held that it
applies to tribal civil jurisdiction as well. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
Reservations are lands formally reserved for Indians through treaties, federal statutes, or executive orders.
See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 473-81, 493 (1982 ed.). Lands within reservations
are communal lands that are set apart for the benefit of all tribal members and held in trust. See id. at 34-38.
Dependent Indian communities are areas largely populated by Indians on lands set apart for Indians outside of
reservations. See id. at 38-39. Allotments are lands within or outside of reservations that are individually owned
by Indians and that are either restricted against alienation or held in trust. See id. at 39-41.
4. See Mustang Prod., 94 F.3d at 1385-86.
5. However, there have been several cases where states have attempted, unsuccessfully to assert taxing
authority over allotted lands. For example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. ChickasawNation, 115 S. Ct. 2214
(1995), Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993), and Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), the State of Oklahoma attempted
to impose various taxes on three different tribes with allotted lands. See infra notes 189-193 and accompanying
text. Oklahoma's actions have been characterized as attempts to "shrink" Indian country. See generally Gloria
Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest Tribal Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REV.
1281 (1995).
6. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL INDIAN AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND
INDIAN TRUST AREAS 341-97 (1974) [hereinafter INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND INDIAN TRUST AREAS].
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jurisdiction.7 Shortly after enactment, nineteen companies and one individual
(collectively, Mustang), who were developing oil and gas operations on allotted
lands, filed separate suits in federal district court against the Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tribal Business Committee and Tax Commission.' The suits challenged the
Tribes' authority to impose the severance tax on oil and gas production on
allotted lands, but did not challenge the tribal tax imposed on production on other
tribal trust lands.9 The district court consolidated and stayed the cases because
Mustang had not exhausted its tribal court remedies in accordance with the federal
tribal abstention doctrine.' ° As a result, the cases were first litigated in the tribal
courts."t The Tribal District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Tribes, and the Tribal Supreme Court affirmed the decision on appeal. 2
Subsequently, the cases were reopened in federal district court.' 3 In July 1995,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted
summary judgment in favor of the Tribes, upholding that allotted lands are subject
to tribal taxation and that the Tribes could impose a severance tax on oil and gas
production on allotted lands.' 4 In August 1996, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 5
III. HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Previous Cases Did Not Decide Whether Indian Tribes Have the Power to
Tax Economic Activity on Allotted Lands
Whether an Indian tribe can tax economic activity on allotted lands was
previously raised, but not resolved in a case that arose in New Mexico: Pittsburg
& Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie,' 6 which subsequently became Pittsburg

7. See Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch, 890 F. Supp. 995, 998-99 (W.D. Okla. 1995), affid, Mustang Prod.
Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997).
8. See id at 997.
9. See id
10. See id The tribal abstention doctrine requires federal courts to refrain from deciding a particular matter
arising in Indian country until the appropriate tribal court has had an opportunity to consider the matter. See
National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
11. See Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tax Comm'n, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer
Training Program) 6095 (Cheyenne-Arapaho D. Ct. 1991).
12. See Mustang Fuel, 890 F. Supp. at 997.
13. See id
14. See id. at 1004. On the question of whether all allotted lands are, by definition, Indian country, the
Tenth Circuit in Mustang Production, in contrast to the district court, see Mustang Fuel, 890 F. Supp. at 100002, noted that "[iln Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation. 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993), the Supreme
Court specifically stated that 'Indian allotments, whether restricted or held in trust by the United States,' are
Indian country." Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1288 (1997). All Indian allotments are held in trust or are restricted against alienation. Indian lands that are
neither held in trust, nor restricted in some way, are fee patent lands.
15. See Mustang Prod, 94 F.3d at 1386. It is important to note the standard of review employed by the
court. Following the Ninth Circuit's lead, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the tribal court's findings of fact for clear
error and reviewed the tribal court's conclusions of law de nova. See id. at 1384 (citing FMC v. ShoshoneBannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1990)). The Tenth Circuit's approach is also consistent with
the Supreme Court's policy, announced in National Farmers Union hisurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
of promoting tribal self-government by encouraging the development of a full factual and legal record in tribal
court. See 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985).
16. 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1990).
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& Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman.'7 The same tax issue also was raised
in an Oklahoma case, Conoco, Inc. v. Arkeketa."8
In Yazzie and Watchman, the courts considered, but did not decide, whether an
Indian tribe could tax economic activity on allotted lands. 9 Instead of directly
answering the tax question, the two courts sought to establish whether the lands
in question constituted Indian country. 20 In Yazzie, the predecessor case to
Watchman, the Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company challenged the Navajo
Nation's business activity tax, which was imposed on economic activity in Navajo
Indian country that included allotted lands.2 ' The mining company contended
that the Navajo Nation lacked the authority to tax activity outside its "formal"
reservation boundaries. 22 Conversely, the Navajo Nation argued that it had the
authority to tax the company even though the company's south mine was located
outside the Navajo Nation's formal reservation boundaries because the mine was
still located within Navajo Indian country."3 The court determined that the south
mine was situated on lands that had been diminished 24 by two executive orders
issued in 1908 and 1911.25 The executive orders resulted in a "checkerboarded ' ' 26 area and ambiguous exterior boundaries in the eastern portion of the
Navajo reservation.27 The Yazzie court was uncertain whether the lands
remained Indian country, as provided by 18 U.S.C. section 1151, and thus

17. 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995). The history of Yazzie and Watchman is quite complicated. The initial
case filed in federal district court was Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Saunders, No. 86-1442-M
(D.N.M. Aug. 22, 1988) (Memorandum Opinion and Order). See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v.
Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1432 app. C (10th Cir. 1990). On appeal, the case became Pittsburg & Midway Coal
Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1990), and was remanded. On appeal, Yazzie became Pittsburg
& Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995). Changes in the case name were due
to changes in the tribal administration and the members of the Navajo Nation Tax Commission.
18. 23 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) 3043 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 26, 1996).
19. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1546; Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1422.
20. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1546; Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1422.
21. See Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1388.
22. See id. The Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company operates a strip-coal mine east of Window
Rock, Arizona, the capital of the Navajo Nation, and near the Arizona-New Mexico state line. Its north mine
is located on the Navajo reservation. See Watchman. 52 F.3d at 1534-36. Its south mine is located outside the
"formal" reservation boundaries of the Navajo Nation. See id. at 1534.
23. See Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1389.
24. The terms "diminishment" and "disestablishment," often used interchangeably in diminishment cases,
refer to Indian lands that are perceived to have lost their "reservation" status due to the cession of tribal lands
to the federal government and the conversion of tribal lands to allotments and private fee lands during the
General Allotment Act Era. See generally Robert Laurence. The Dominant Society's Judicial Reluctance to Allow
Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography and the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781 (1996); Lauren Natasha Soil, The Only Good Indian Reservation Is a Diminished
Reservation? The New and Diluted Canons of Construction in hIdian Law, 41 FED. B. NEws & J. 544 (1994).
See also Royster, supra note 2, at 29-43. The two terms are also used interchangeably in this Note.
25. See Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1420-22.
26. Many Indian reservations became "checkerboarded" with different types of land as a result of the
allotment process during the General Allotment Act Era. See Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property,
86 N.W. L. REV. 1, 9 (1991). Today, lands within many Indian reservations include tribal trust lands, individual
allotments, and non-Indian fee lands. See id
27. See Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1420-22. The Navajo Nation essentially has two boundaries in the eastern part
of its reservation, the formal reservation boundaries and "Navajo Indian country" boundaries (which encompass
all allotted lands). The tribe has defined its territorial jurisdiction as synonymous with Navajo Indian country.
See NAVAiO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 254 (1996).
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remanded the case for such a determination.28 On remand,
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The Navajo Nation was dissatisfied with the district court's finding in Yazzie
because the area at issue was comprised of a substantial amount of allotted lands
and was near a dependent Indian community.30 On appeal the case was renamed
Watchman.3 1 The Watchman court agreed with the Navajo Nation that the
2
allotted lands in the area were, by definition, Indian country. Although the
court found that "the Navajo Nation ha[d] the authority to apply its Business
Activities Tax to the source gains from the 47% portion of the South McKinley
Mine that lies within the individual Navajo trust allotments, 3 3 the court also
concluded that the allotted lands alone were insufficient to satisfy tribal abstention
requirements.3 The court went on to hold that if the district court were to find
that the mine and its surroundings constituted a dependent Indian community,
then the federal court would be required to stay its hand until the tribal court
adjudicated the relevant issues.35
The Watchman court concluded that the district court erred in its analysis of
whether the South McKinley Mine site was part of a dependent Indian community
because the district court had "examin[ed] the mine site in isolation from the
37
surrounding area"36 and had used an inappropriate "community of reference.
After delineating the appropriate factors to be considered in the determination of
a dependent Indian community, the Watchman court again remanded the case to
the district court for a ruling on whether the lands on which the south mine was
situated constituted a dependent Indian community. 38 As a result, the Tenth
Circuit never reached the tax issue. On remand, the district court never reached
the dependent Indian community issue because it dismissed the case. 39 Had the
district court determined that the mine site was part of a dependent Indian
community, the entire south mine would have been located within Navajo Indian
country and therefore fully subject to Navajo taxes.
Conoco, Inc. v. Arkeketa raised the same issue underlying Yazzie, Watchman,
and Mustang Production regarding tribal authority to tax oil and gas production
on allotted lands.' In Arkeketa, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma upheld the severance tax imposed by the Ponca Tribe on oil

28. See Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1422.
29. See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995)
(discussing district court opinion).
30. See id, at 1535-36, 154143; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b), (c) (1994); supra note 3.
31. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1534 n.l; see also supra note 17.
32. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1541.
33. Id at 1542 n.l.
34. See id at 1541, 1542.
35. See id at 1541, 1546.
36. Id. at 1543.
37. See id at 154245.
38. See id at 1541. 1546.
39. The district court issued an order dismissing with prejudice the Watchman case. See Pittsburg &
Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, No. CIV 86-1442M (D.N.M. July 10, 1996), .appeal dismissed per
order. The dismissal means that the company must pay the Navajo Nation taxes at issue on the south mine,
including back taxes.
40. See 23 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) 3043 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 26, 1996).
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and gas lessees doing business on allotted lands. 41 Arkeketa was decided shortly
before the Tenth Circuit decided Mustang Production.42
By establishing that allotted lands constitute Indian country, no matter where
they are located, and that Indian tribes retain civil jurisdiction over allotted lands,
including the power to tax, the decision in Mustang Productionclearly reinforces
the holding in Arkeketa-and answers the tax issue left unresolved in Yazzie and
Watchman.4 3
B. History of the Relocation of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes
The Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes are located in western Oklahoma.4 A
brief historical review of the relocation of the Tribes from their traditional
homelands to Oklahoma, and the federal government's subsequent treatment of
the Tribes, is necessary to put Mustang Production in perspective.
The United States entered into the Treaty of 1865 4 with the Cheyenne and
Arapaho Tribes in order to relocate them from their traditional homelands in the
northern plains area to Oklahoma.' The 1865 Treaty set aside for the Tribes
a reservation that was located partially in Kansas and partially in Oklahoma.4 7
Upon ratification, Congress amended the 1865 Treaty so that the reservation
would be located entirely within Oklahoma, resulting inthe Treaty of 1867. 49
However, the Tribes mistakenly located to an area south of their designated
reservation.' Rather than make the Tribes move again, President Grant issued
an executive order in 18695' to correct the problem and delineate reservation
boundaries that conformed to the lands the Tribes actually occupied.52

41. See id.at 3044.
42. Arkeketa was decided on January 26, 1996 and Mustang Production was decided August 23, 1996.
43. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1386 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1288
(1997). However, Mustang Productiondid not address the other issue raised by Watchman-whether an Indian
tribe has the authority to tax economic activity on lands within dependent Indian communities. Because
Watchman was dismissed, that issue will have to be addressed by future cases. There are several cases pending
appeal which may resolve that issue. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908 (1st
Cir. 1996); Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th
Cir. 1996), overruling 1995 WL 462232 (D. Alaska 1995), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
44. Although the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes are federally recognized as one Indian tribe, see Oklahoma
Indian Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (1994), the Mustang Production court discussed the two tribes as
'Tribes." See generally Mustang Prod, 94 F.3d 1382. This Note will also discuss the Cheyenne and Arapaho
Tribes as "Tribes."
45. Treaty between the United States of America and the Cheyenne and Arrapahoe Tribes of Indians (1865
Treaty), 14 Stat. 703 (1865); see CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN TREATIES 1778-1883, at 887-91 (1972).
46. See Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch, 890 F. Supp. 995, 997 (W.D. Okla. 1995), affid, Mustang Prod. Co.
v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. .1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1288 (1997).
47. See id. at 997.
48. See id at 997-98.
49. Treaty between the United States of America and the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Tribes of Indian (1867
Treaty), 15 Stat. 593 (1867); see KAPPLER, supra note 45, at 984-89.
50. See Mustang Fuel, 890 F. Supp. at 998.
51. Executive Order, Aug. 10, 1869, available in 1 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS, AND
TREATIES 838-41 (1974).
52. See Mustang Fuel, 890 F. Supp. at 998.
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In 1887, the federal government adopted the General Allotment Act,53 which
was designed to advance the federal government's Indian assimilation policy.
The goal of the General Allotment Act was to terminate tribal governments and
extinguish tribal territories by dismantling the tribal land base.M Under the
General Allotment Act, tribal lands were parceled out to individual tribal
members because "advocates of the policy believed that individual ownership of
property would turn the Indians [into] . . . settled, agrarian, and civilized"
citizens. 55 Any lands that were deemed "surplus" were ceded to the federal
government and eventually sold to non-Indian homesteaders. 56
As part of its Indian assimilation policy, the federal government entered into
the Allotment and Cession Agreement of 1890V with the Cheyenne and Arapaho
Tribes, which was ratified as the Act of March 3, 1891 (1891 Act). 58 The
Allotment and Cession Agreement of 1890 accomplished three things. First, the
Tribes agreed to absolutely cede "their interest in the reservation" 59 created by
the 1867 Treaty. Second, the Tribes agreed to cede "their interest in the
reservation defined by the 1869 [E]xecutive [O]rder." 6 This cession was
"[s]ubject to the allotment of land in severalty to the individual members of the
Cheyenne and Arapaho [T]ribes of Indians, as hereinafter provided for and subject
to the conditions hereinafter imposed.",6 ' Third, the Tribes agreed to allot tribal
lands out of the 1869 reservation to individual tribal members. 62 By 1892, all
required tribal allotments had been made, allowing remaining "surplus" lands to
be opened to non-Indian settlers.63
In the 1930s, the allotment program was severely and justifiably criticized as
6
a "method[] of repression and suppression unparalleled in the modern world."
As a result of such criticism, and because the Indian assimilation policy was a
dismal failure, the federal government officially repudiated the assimilation policy
and ended the allotment program by adopting the Indian Reorganization Act of
193465 (IRA). The IRA sought to repair the harm done by the General
Allotment Act66 by reorganizing tribal governments and restoring lost tribal

53. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1994) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 8, 1887,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)) (also known as the Dawes Act).
54. See generally Royster, supra note 2, for a detailed history of the devastating and lingering effects of
the General Allotment Act on tribal governments, tribal lands, and individual Indians.

55. ld. at 9.
56. See id.
57. Cited in Act of March 3, 1891 (1891 Act), ch. 543, § 13, 26 Stat. 1022 (1891).
58. Ch. 543, § 13, 26 Stat. 989, 1022-25 (1891) (ratifying verbatim the Allotment and Cession Agreement
of 1890); see also Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch, 890 F. Supp. 995,998 (W.D. Okla. 1995), afftd, Mustang Prod.
Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997).
59. Mustang Fuel, 890 F. Supp. at 998.

60. Id.
61.

Id. (first alteration in Mustang Fuel) (paraphrasing 1891 Act, 26 Stat. at 1022).

62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 729 F.2d 1192, 1197 n.14 (1984) (quoting Congressman
Howard, 78 CONG. REc. 11, 727-29 (1934)).
65. Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-483

(1994)).
66. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349,
381 (1994)). The IRA excluded the Oklahoma tribes; instead, they were provided for by the Oklahoma Indian
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lands. 67 As a result of the IRA, the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes regained some of
their tribal lands lost during the General Allotment Act Era, including lands that
were within the boundaries of the 1869 reservation. Similarly, individual Indians
retained their lands, including allotments within the 1869 reservation.6
IV. RATIONALE
Within the above historical context, Mustang argued that because the original
1869 reservation of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes was disestablished, the Tribes'
civil jurisdiction over the allotments, including the power to tax, was divested. 69
Mustang further argued that no congressional act had restored the CheyenneArapaho Tribes' civil jurisdiction over the allotments. 0 Conversely, the Tribes
argued that the issue of disestablishment was immaterial to tribal civil jurisdiction
over the allotted lands because the federal allotment policy did not explicitly
divest Indian tribes of jurisdiction over allotted lands. 7,
In Mustang Production,the Tenth Circuit engaged in a three-part analysis to
determine whether the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes had the authority to tax
economic activity on allotted lands. First, the court disposed of the reservation
disestablishment issue.
Second, the court addressed the Tribes' civil
jurisdiction, including the power to tax, over Indian country.73 Third, the court
reviewed the impact of the Allotment and Cession Agreement of 1890 on the
Tribes' present civil jurisdiction over allotted lands. 74
A. Disestablishment of the Reservation
As a result of the General Allotment Act Era, some Indian reservations were
"diminished" or "disestablished" when tribal lands were ceded to the federal
government and converted to allotments and private fee lands.75 Because states
no longer perceived those reservations as formal Indian reservations, they often
asserted jurisdiction over the diminished reservations. 6
Nevertheless,
diminishment or disestablishment of a reservation generally did not affect tribal
civil jurisdiction over the lands that tribes or tribal members retained, including
allotted lands.77 In Mustang Production, the Tenth Circuit refused to engage in
a full-scale disestablishment analysis regarding the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes'

Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (1994), which had essentially the same objectives and similar provisions as
the IRA. See Mustang Fuel, 890 F. Supp. at 998.
67. See Royster, supra note 2. at 15-18.
68. See Mustang Fuel, 890 F. Supp. at 998.
69. See id. at 1000.
70. See id
71. See Defendants/Appellees' Response Brief at 12, Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th
Cir. 1996) (Nos. 95-6287 & 95-6292), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997).
72. See Mustang Prod, 94 F.3d at 1385.
73. See id at 1384-85.
74. See id. at 1385-86.
75. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466-69 (1984).
76. See ROBERT N. CLITroN ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 788-89 (3d ed. 1991).

77. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 467 n.8.
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civil jurisdiction over the allotted lands. 78 The court's refusal appears to be
based on two considerations. First, the issue of disestablishment of the CheyenneArapaho reservation had already been considered in previous Tenth Circuit
cases. 79 And second, the court was bound by the Supreme Court's opinion in
80
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, which ruled that prior
disestablishment of a reservation is irrelevant when considering the tax immunity
of allotted lands in Indian country.8 '
In Sac and Fox, the State of Oklahoma claimed that it could tax tribal members
82
However, the
because the Sac and Fox reservation had been disestablished.
the federal
on
focused
instead
and
argument
that
Supreme Court disregarded
3
civil
exercise
could
state
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Indian country statute
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The
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Indian country extended to "Indian allotments, whether restricted or held in trust
5
Oklahoma was
by the United States," despite disestablishment,8 and that
country. 86
Indian
over
power
taxing
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prohibited
While the Sac and Fox Court considered whether a state had power to tax
economic activity on allotments, the Court did not consider whether a tribe could
tax that same activity. Nevertheless, on that question, the Mustang Production
court, consistent with the reasoning in Sac and Fox, concluded that
"disestablishment of the reservation [was] not dispositive of the question of tribal
jurisdiction. 8 7 Thus, disestablishment of a tribe's reservation appears to be
irrelevant where an Indian tribe has tribal civil jurisdiction over lands that remain
in the possession of the tribe or over tribal members under the federal Indian
country statute. 8
B. Civil Jurisdictionand the Power to Tax
The court in Mustang Production properly utilized the Indian country statute
to determine whether the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes could impose taxes on

78. See Mustang Prod, 94 F.3d at 1385. In a full-scale diminishment analysis, the court would have
employed the criteria delineated in Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-72. (For a description of the Solem criteria, see infra
note 127 and accompanying text.) Nonetheless, it is unlikely the outcome in Mustang Production would have
differed even with such an analysis.
79. See Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. Oklahoma, 681 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1982); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes
v. Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1980); Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir. 1965). Dicta in
these three cases suggest that the Cheyenne-Arapaho reservation was disestablished. However, no court has
engaged in a formal disestablishment analysis of the Cheyenne-Arapaho reservation in accordance with the criteria
established by the Supreme Court in 1984 in Solent, 465 U.S. at470-72. Thus, the Tribes contended that the federal
courts have never adequately addressed the merits of that issue. See Defendants/Appellees' Response Brief at 4243, Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996) (Nos. 95-6287 and 95-6292), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 1288 (1997).
80. 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
81. See id at 124.
82. See id. at 121.

83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994); see also supra note 3.
84. See Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 123.
85. i
86. See id at 128.
87. Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288
(1997).

88. See id
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economic activity on allotted lands.8 9 The court relied on the Indian country
statute, as well as DeCoteau v. District County Court9° and Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,9' to establish the nexus
between allotments in Indian country and the Tribes' territorial jurisdiction.92
Mustang contended that the Indian country statute applied only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to civil jurisdiction.93 The court flatly rejected Mustang's
argument because the Supreme Court disposed of that issue in DeCoteau.' In
DeCoteau, the Court held that the Indian country statute extended to civil
jurisdiction and that despite the cession of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe's
reservation lands, the tribe's "retention of allotments would provide an adequate
fulcrum for tribal affairs" over which there was to remain "exclusive tribal and
federal jurisdiction." 95
In Potawatomi, the result of the application of the Indian country test turned
on whether the allotted lands had been "validly set apart for the use of the
Indians." 96 Because the allotted lands were held in trust for the benefit of tribal
members, the Supreme Court found that the allotments clearly qualified as Indian
country. 97 Basing its decision on these cases, the court in Mustang Production
concluded that allotments were part of Indian country, and that the Indian country
statute was sufficient to support98the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes' exercise of civil
jurisdiction over the allotments.
Next, the Mustang Production court addressed the Tribes' authority to tax nonIndians. Mustang contended that Sac and Fox was inapplicable to tribal taxing
authority because Sac and Fox dealt with state taxes. 99 Although Sac and Fox
addressed a state jurisdictional issue, the Mustang Productioncourt noted that the
issues were analogous because they both considered "whether one government can
tax citizens of another government engaging in activities on allotted lands. ' 1°
The court then turned to Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe'0 ' to address
2
specifically the question of the Tribes' authority to tax Mustang. 1
In Merrion,the Supreme Court held that an Indian tribe has the power to tax as
part of its inherent sovereignty °3 and that the power to tax does not emanate, in
any sense, from the federal government. °4 "The power to tax is an essential

89. See id.at1385-86.
90. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
91. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
92. See Mustang Prod, 94 F.3d at 1384-85.
93. See id at 1385.
94. See id
95. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446.
96. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 511 (quoting United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978)).
97. See id.
98. See Mustang Prod, 94 F.3d at 1384. For discussion of Solem v. Bartlett,. 465 U.S. 463 (1984), and
reservation diminishment, see infra Part V.A.
99. See Mustang Prod., 94 F.3d at 1385.
100. Id
101. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
102. See Mustang Prod., 94 F.3d at 1385.
103. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 159.
104. See id at 140. Because the power to tax is an inherent power, it is not dependent on congressional
authorization. See id at 148-49.
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attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of selfgovernment and territorial management."'" ° Furthermore, where a business
receives governmental benefits, such as police protection, from the tribal
government, the business can be required to contribute through taxes to the general
maintenance costs of that government.'06 Although Merrion dealt with a "formal"
reservation setting, the court in Mustang Production reasoned that the holding of
Merrion logically extends to allotments because Indian tribes retain "jurisdiction
over the persons and property within the limits of the territory they occupy."' 0 7
Therefore, consistent with Merrion, the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes have the power
to tax Mustang's economic activity on allotted lands because of their inherent
sovereignty, and because it is appropriate for a company receiving benefits from a
tribal government to contribute to that tribal government's operation.
C. The Allotment and Cession Agreement of 1890
Finally, the Mustang Production court reviewed the Allotment and Cession
Agreement of 1890 to address Mustang's contention that the Tribes ceded all their
reservation lands in return for the federal government's creation of allotments to
tribal members "out of the lands ceded."" ° The court also addressed Mustang's
argument that the Tribes' civil jurisdiction, including the authority to tax, was
completely destroyed with the cession of all lands' t9 -that is, without an
affirmative grant of civil jurisdiction over allotted lands from Congress, the Tribes
had no power to tax. The court determined that the allotted lands were never
"Instead,
ceded to the federal government with the rest of the tribal lands."
the allotted lands were set aside for the use of the Indians, remaining part of
Indian country even after the reservation was disestablished.""' Thus, the court
rejected Mustang's argument that the Tribes were without power to tax because
Congress had not "re-granted" the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes civil jurisdiction
over the allotted lands. The court reasoned that because the allotments have been
held in trust continuously by the federal government," 2 the Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tribes' civil jurisdiction and power to tax had never been divested." 3
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
It is unquestioned that an Indian tribe has the power to tax lands within its
formal reservation boundaries." 4 The decision in Mustang Production is
particularly important because no previous federal cases have addressed the issue
105. letat 137.
106. See id at 138.
107. Id at 140 (quoting S. RP. No. 45-698, at 1-2 (1879)).
108. Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1386 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Act of March 3, 1891, 26
Stat. 989, 1022-1025 (1891) (verbatim ratification of the Allotment and Cession Agreement of 1890)), cet.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997).
109. See Mustang Prod., 94 F.3d at 1384-85.
110. See id at 1386.
111. 1d
112. See id
113. See Mustang Prod, 94 F.3d at 1386.
114. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians. 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Both cases affirmed tribal power to tax within formal Indian reservations.
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of tribal taxing authority over allotted lands located outside formal Indian
reservations. By firmly establishing that an Indian tribe can tax economic activity
on allotted lands, wherever they are located, the court in Mustang Production has
Further,
eliminated one more uncertainty for Indian taxing authority." 5
to
is
sufficient
Mustang Productionhas reaffirmed that the Indian country statute
6
substantiate a tribe's civil jurisdiction over allotted lands."
The following sections focus on three points. First, diminishment or
disestablishment of a reservation has little or no impact on tribal taxing authority
over lands that the tribe or tribal members continue to occupy. Second, the power
to tax is an aspect of the inherent sovereign power retained by tribal governments,
which is not dependent on any congressional authorization for legitimacy. Third,
allotted lands are part of Indian country and remain subject to tribal civil
jurisdiction.
A. The Impact of Disestablishmenton Tribal Taxing Authority
Diminishment of a reservation does not divest Indian tribes of civil jurisdiction
over the allotted lands possessed by tribal members." 7 Because the federal
government allotted tribal lands to individual tribal members and opened
"surplus" lands to non-Indians under the General Allotment Act,"' the land
pattern on many reservations eventually became "checkerboarded" with tribal
trust lands; individual allotted lands; and private, non-Indian lands.' 9 Although
the federal government stopped the allotment process, the problems resulting from
the checkerboard land pattern are irreversible.
The checkerboard land pattern is the root of many civil jurisdictional problems
that now exist between Indian tribes and states, particularly in areas where
reservation boundaries are not readily discernible.' 20 In such situations, some
states have asserted taxing authority over Indians living on trust lands or allotted
lands that are located outside a formal reservation or within a disestablished
reservation.' 2 ' However, in such situations, courts have rejected state authority
to tax because Indian tribes maintain civil jurisdiction over such lands pursuant
to the federal Indian country statute. 22 If states are precluded from exercising
jurisdiction over Indian country, it necessarily follows that Indian tribes retain
civil jurisdiction over Indian-owned lands within Indian country because
"[w]ithout regard to its source, sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an
enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction,

115.

See Mustang Prod., 94 F.3d at 1386.

116. See id
117. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 467 (1984).
118. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1994) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 8. 1887,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)) (also known as the Dawes Act).
119. See Singer, supra note 26, at 9. Non-Indians purchased lands within Indian reservations in two ways.
The General Allotment Act allowed non-Indians to purchase ceded tribal lands, and, Indians who had received
fee patents to their allotted lands sold their lands to non-Indian buyers. See Royster, supra note 2,at 12-13 &
nn.59-60.
120. See CLINTON, supra note 76, at 788-89.
121. See, e.g., discussion supra note 5.
122. See, e.g., discussion supra note 5.
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and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms."'23
In the seminal diminishment case of Solem v. Bartlett,24 the Supreme Court
stated that "[riegardless of whether the original reservation was diminished,
Federal and tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over those portions of the
opened lands that were and have remained Indian allotments."'25 The Court
126
further stated that "[d]iminishment ... will not be lightly inferred."'
Accordingly, the Court in Solem articulated a set of criteria to determine whether
a particular surplus land act resulted in diminishment. The criteria included
consideration of: (1) statutory language; (2) surrounding circumstances; and (3)
subsequent treatment.
Had the court in Mustang Production engaged in a
full-scale diminishment analysis of the Cheyenne-Arapaho reservation, it would
have had to employ these Solem factors in its determination. The court in
Mustang Production did not conduct a Solem diminishment analysis because it
found that the Indian country statute was sufficient to establish that 2the
Cheyenne8
Arapaho Tribes retained civil jurisdiction over the allotted lands.
Of the major reseivation diminishment cases decided by the Supreme Court
since 1962, none have dealt with a tribal or state taxation issue. 129 The two
cases that have attempted to deal with reservation diminishment within the context
of taxation are Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe"3" and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation.'3 ' However,
the Supreme Court ignored the diminishment issue in both cases because, despite
diminishment, tribal sovereignty remained intact. 32 Thus, the tribes 33could
continue to exercise civil jurisdiction over the lands they still possessed.
In Potawatomi,the State of Oklahoma argued that the Potawatomi reservation
had been disestablished, and, therefore, assessed the Potawatomi Tribe with $2.7
million in back taxes for cigarette sales made by a tribally-owned convenience
store. 34 The store was located on tribal land held in trust by the federal government. 135 Nonetheless, the state argued that it had the authority to tax the conven123. Mem-ion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982).
124. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
125. Id. at 467 n.8.
126. Id at 470.
127. See id at 470-72.
128. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1385-86 (10th Cir. 1996). cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1288 (1997); see also supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
129. Besides Solem, there have been five other Supreme Court diminishment cases. See Hagen v. Utah, 510
U.S. 399 (1994) (holding that the Uintah Indian Reservation was diminished when reservation lands were opened
to non-Indian settlers); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the Rosebud Sioux
Reservation was diminished by three unilateral acts of Congress); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425 (1975) (habeas corpus case holding that the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation was terminated by an
agreement executed between the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe and the United States); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481
(1973) (holding that the Klamath River Reservation was not terminated by the Act of 1892 and that all lands
within the boundaries of the reservation remained Indian country); Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington
State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) (habeas corpus case holding that opening the southern half of the
Colville Indian Reservation did not diminish the reservation).
130. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
131. 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
132. See Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 125; Potawatoni, 498 U.S. at 511.
133. See Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 125; Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 511.
134. See Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 507.
135. See id.
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ience store because the tribe no longer had a formally designated reservation to
afford protection from state taxes." The Court ignored the disestablishment
argument because the status of the land was clearly Indian country.'37 The
Supreme Court stated that the test for determining if the land in question constituted
Indian country was whether the tribal land had been "validly set apart" for the use
of Indians.1 38 Because the land in question was held in trust, it was clearly Indian
country. 139 Thus, the Court held that Oklahoma was precluded from imposing its
taxes on the tribe and tribal members."4 The Potawatomi Court analogized tribal
trust lands not located within a formal Indian reservation to lands within a formally
designated Indian reservation because the ownership of both types remained in
Indian hands. 4 '
In Sac and Fox, the State of Oklahoma attempted to argue the disestablishment
issue again. But, prior to discussing Sac and Fox, it is necessary to digress and
briefly address an earlier state tax case that was the basis for the Sac and Fox
decision. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 42 the State of
Arizona imposed an income tax on a Navajo Indian living and working on the
Navajo Nation. 43 The state argued that a personal income tax was legitimate
The Court in
because it did not infringe on tribal self-government.'"
McClanahan rejected the state's argument because the tax violated the federal
government's policy of "permitting the Indians largely to govern themselves, free
from state interference."'' 45 Thus, the Court held that Arizona was prohibited from
taxing the income of a reservation Indian when that income was generated wholly
from reservation sources. '
Likewise, in Sac and Fox, the State of Oklahoma imposed an income tax and
motor vehicle taxes on members of the Sac and Fox Tribe. 47 The state argued
that McClanahan did not apply in Sac and Fox because the Sac and Fox Tribe
did not have "formal" reservation boundaries; that is, that the Sac and Fox
The Supreme Court stated that it had
reservation had been disestablished.'
"rejected precisely the same argument-and from precisely the same litigant" in
1 49 Again, the Court declined to address the disestablishment issue,
Potawatomi.
and held that Indian country extended to "formal and informal reservations,
dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments, whether restricted or held
in trust by the United States," despite disestablishment.' 50 Thus, Sac and Fox

136. See id. at 511.
137. See id
138.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
(1965)).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id

See id
See id at512.
See id at511.
411 U.S. 164 (1973).
See id at165.
See id at 179.
Id. at 170 (quoting Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686-87
See id at 165.
See Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 119.
See id at120-21.
Id at124.
Id at123.
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extended the McClanahan presumption against state taxes beyond formal
reservations to include other types of Indian lands.'
The above Supreme Court disestablishment cases illustrate that where an Indian
tribe can rely on the federal Indian country statute as a basis for tribal civil
jurisdiction over tribal and allotted lands, diminishment does not impact tribal
authority to tax. Accordingly, so long as the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes' civil
jurisdiction over allotted lands remained intact, the court in Mustang Production
was correct in refusing to engage in a full, Solemn-type diminishment analysis.
B. Indian Tribes Have the Inherent Power to Tax
"Indian sovereignty is not a 'platonic' concept."' t52 Although Indian tribes
have been characterized as "domestic dependant nations[,]' ' 53 they nonetheless
'
constitute "distinct, independent political communitiesM
with powers of self5
5
government.
Indian tribes exercise their powers of self-government "not by
virtue of any delegation of powers, but rather by reason of their original tribal
sovereignty."'156 Furthermore, the power to tax is "an inherent and essential
part
5
of the authority of any government," including tribal governments. 1
Prior to Mustang Production,only one federal court case had confirmed tribal
authority to tax activity on allotted lands that are outside of a reservation but still
Indian country. 5 1 Only two recent Supreme Court cases have affirmed tribal
taxation. However, both Supreme Court cases were within the context of a formal
reservation.t5 9
Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe"W is the seminal Supreme Court case that
affirmed tribal taxing authority on an Indian reservation. Merrion provided one
basis for the Mustang Production decision.' 6 ' In Merrion, several non-Indian
lessees challenged the tribal severance tax imposed on oil and gas production

151. See id. at 125.
152. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 204 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)).
153. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
154. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
155. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 232.
156. Id. (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978)); see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
157. COHEN, supra note 3, at 431; see Merrion, 455 U.S. at 149.
158. See Conoco, Inc. v. Arkeketa, 23 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) 3043 (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 26, 1996).
159. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion, 455 U.S. 130; see
also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1979) (the Court, in
addressing various state taxes, also sustained tribal cigarette taxes); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904)
(upholding the Chickasaw Nation's privilege tax on livestock owned by non-citizens within its territory). Only
three lower federal court cases affirming tribal taxes were found by this Note's author: Arkekera. 23 Indian L.
Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) 3043 (affirming the Ponca Tribe's authority to impose an oil and
gas severance tax on allotted lands); Burlington Northern Railroad. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian
Reservation, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding the Blackfeet Tribe's authority to tax rights-of-way
crossing its reservation); and Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905) (expressly approving a tribal permit
tax of non-Indian owned businesses on fee land within the reservation).
160. 455 U.S. 130.
161. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288
(1997).
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within the Jicarilla Apache reservation in New Mexico.' 62 The lessees argued
that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe's authority to tax stemmed exclusively from the
tribe's power to exclude persons from reservation lands. 63 Because the tribe
had not conditioned its mineral leases upon payment of the severance tax, the
lessees argued that the tribe had no authority to impose the tax at a later date. 6
The Court in Merrion rejected the lessees' arguments and stated that:
The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is
a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. This
power enables a tribal government to raise revenues for its essential services.
The power does not derive solely from the Indian tribe's power to exclude
non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe's general
authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction
165

The Merrion Court further reasoned that the lessees had availed themselves of the
privileges of conducting business on the reservation and that the existence of state
authority to tax the same transactions did not deprive the tribe of its power to
tax.166 Therefore, the Court held that the tribe could exercise its inherent power
to tax "unless and until Congress divests this power."' 67
The Mustang Production court correctly reasoned that the only difference
between Merrion and the case at bar was one of land status' 68 and thus affirmed
the Cheyenne-Arapaho tribal taxes.' 69 The difference in the land status in
Merrion and Mustang Productionwas inconsequential because tribes retained title
Therefore, the Mustang
to both reservation lands and allotted lands. 70
Production court properly extended the Merrion presumption of tribal taxing
authority within a formal reservation to allotted lands that were not located within
a formal reservation, but were still, by definition, within Indian country.
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,'7 ' decided shortly after
Merrion, is the second Supreme Court case affirming tribal taxing authority
within a reservation. In Kerr-McGee Corp., a uranium mining company
challenged the Navajo Nation's Possessory Interest Tax and Business Activity
Tax. 72 The mining company argued that the taxes were void because the
Secretary of the Interior had never approved them. 73 This contention stemmed
from the fact that, in Merrion, Secretarial approval was a significant factor in
establishing the validity of the tribal tax at issue, because the Jicarilla Apache

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
(1997).
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133.
See id at 144.
See id at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
See id at 136-37.
Id. at 159.
See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1288
See
See
471
See
See

id at 1386.
id
U.S. 195 (1985).
id. at 197.
id
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Tribe was organized under the IRA. 174 However, because the Navajo Tribe was
not organized under the IRA, it did not have a constitution requiring Secretarial
approval for imposition of a tax. 75 Thus, the Court concluded that Secretarial
approval was irrelevant and upheld the tribal taxes. 176 In essence, the KerrMcGee Corp. Court put77to rest any notion that taxation is not an inherent power
of tribal governments.
The Supreme Court cases discussed above stand for the proposition that Indian
tribes have the power to tax as part of their inherent sovereign power over lands
within Indian reservations. This taxing power can be exercised over tribal lands,
even if they are located outside the boundaries of the reservations, because Indian
tribes can "exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and
territories., ' 17' Accordingly, Mustang Production was correctly decided.
C. Allotted Lands in Indian Country Are Subject to Tribal Civil Jurisdiction
The federal government's assimilation policy during the General Allotment Act
Era had a devastating impact on tribal governments and reservation lands.'79
The allotment policy was the "greatest and most concerted attack on the territorial
sovereignty of the tribes.' ' 80 According to one scholar, Indian tribes lost over
90 million acres of land during the General Allotment Act Era.'18
Approximately 60 million acres of Indian lands were lost through the cession of
reservation lands to the federal government and through sales of "surplus" lands
to non-Indian homesteaders. 82 The remaining 30 million acres were lost
through premature sales of allotted lands that were
often the result of forced tax
83
sales or fraudulent conveyances to non-Indians.
The assimilation policy attempted to eliminate tribal governments and subject
all Indian people to state jurisdiction like all other American citizens."' Given
those objectives, Mustang's argument that the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes'
jurisdiction over allotted lands was destroyed during the General Allotment Act
Era appears to have some merit, but only at first blush. 85 Mustang's argument

174. See CLINTON, supra note 76, at 460.

175. See Kerr-McGee Corp., 471 U.S. at 198.
176. See id. at 201.
177. See CLINTON, supra note 76, at 460.
178. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (citing
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)).
179. See Royster, supra note 2, at 6-14.
180. Id. at 6.
181. See id at 12-13 & n.59.
182. See id. at 12-13 & n.60.
183. See id at 11-12.
184. See id at 6, 10.
185. See Richard A. Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country: The Double-Edged Sword of
the Trust Relationship and Trust Responsibility Arising Out of Early Supreme Court Opinions and the General
Allotment Act, 25 N.M. L. REv. 35, 62-63 (1995). Monette explains:
If in the treaty context, "allotment" should be construed as an acknowledgement of the Tribes'
existing territorial rights, why in this context should the word not be construed as
acknowledging a right originating in the Tribes? The very same ideas underlie both
circumstances. This logic would support the notion that, although the United States directed
that Indian (c]ountry be allotted in severalty, it does not mean that the allotments themselves
originated from the United States. Rather, like the exchange of treaty territory, individual
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is contradicted, first, by the fact that the federal government formally repudiated
the allotment process with the adoption of the IRA, and, second, by the fact that
the assimilation policy was abandoned before tribal governments were actually
dismantled.'" Furthermore, one of the express objectives of the IRA was to
restore tribalism.'8 7 Nevertheless, the legacy of the General Allotment Act
continues to haunt tribal governments by resurfacing in cases like Mustang
Production and in other cases dealing with state assertions of jurisdiction over
lands within Indian country. 88
However, in at least three recent cases regarding state assertion of taxing
authority, the Supreme Court has concluded that allotted lands are part of Indian
country, over which Indian tribes retain civil jurisdiction. Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation's9 and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe'90 have already been discussed above. In the
third case, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,'91 the Court
reaffirmed tribal jurisdiction over allotted lands by ruling that Oklahoma could
impose neither a motor fuels tax on the tribe nor an income tax on tribal members
residing in Indian country. 92 In addition, several lower federal courts have
reached the conclusion that allotted
lands are Indian country over which Indian
93
tribes retain civil jurisdiction.
The above cases clearly show that allotted lands are part of Indian country and
are therefore subject to tribal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Mustang Production
court was correct in concluding that allotted lands are Indian country, as provided
by 18 U.S.C. section 1151, no matter where they are located, and that tribal
governments retain civil jurisdiction over such lands.
D. Implications
Indian tribes in the United States possess some 53 million acres of land, of
allotments were carved out of that treaty-recognized territory and thus originated from the
Tribes. Therefore, the Tribes should be the primary governing authority over the property
systems that have emerged within their own territories due to "allotments."
i at 62-63 (footnotes omitted).
186. See Royster, supra note 2, at 15-18.
187. See CLINTON, supra note 76, at 359.
188. See Royster, supra note 2. at 63-77.
189. 508 U.S. 114 (1993) (holding that Oklahoma could not impose motor vehicle taxes and income taxes
on tribal members residing in Indian country); see discussion of Sac and Fox, supra Part IV.A.
190. 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (holding that Oklahoma could not impose a sales tax on the sale of goods to tribal
members residing in Indian country); see discussion of Potaivatoni. supra Part V.A.
191. 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995).
192. See iL at 2224.
193. See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1540-41 (10th Cir. 1995)
(stating that "trust allotments are Indian country by definition under 18 U.S.C. [section] 1151(c)" and the
applicability of 18 U.S.C. section 1151 to both civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian country was firmly
established); Indian Country U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that
the unusual nature of the tribal fee lands, which were equivalent to allotted lands, did not rob these fee lands
of their Indian country status nor of tribal jurisdiction); United States v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768, 772 (D.N.M.
1994) (holding that the allotment at issue, while not within the formal reservation, was within Indian country);
Abhoah v. Housing Auth. of Kiowa Tribe of Indians, 660 P.2d 625, 627-29 (Okla. 1983) (Allotted lands remain
Indian country "whether [they are] within or without continuing reservation boundaries" and, "[w]hile 18 U.S.C.
[section] 1151 ostensibly applies only to issues of criminal jurisdiction, the... Supreme Court has recognized
its generalized applicability to questions of civil jurisdiction.").
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which over 9 million acres are allotted lands.'" These Indian lands contain a
considerable amount of mineral wealth. "Indian tribes, collectively, are the third
largest owners of mineral resources in the nation."""5 Approximately one-third
of all Indian mineral revenue is generated from allotted lands.'9 In 1988,
nearly 40,000 allottees received income from leasing their lands for mineral
development.'" Most of these allottees were located in New Mexico and
Oklahoma. "
. Within the twenty-two Indian reservations in New Mexico, approximately
843,000 acres of land are allotments.'9 The most important implication of
Mustang Production is that Indian tribes in New Mexico can tax economic
activity on allotted lands, including those allotments located outside the formal
boundaries of their reservations. Consequently, Indian tribes in New Mexico can
look to allotted lands under their jurisdiction as an additional source of tax
revenue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mustang Production is a significant affirmation of tribal sovereignty. Mustang
Production reaffirms that Indian tribes possess the power to tax as part of their
inherent sovereign power. Indian tribes now know, with certainty, that they not
only have the authority to tax economic activity on all tribal lands located within
a formal reservation, but that they also have the authority to tax economic activity
on all allotted lands, even if such lands lie outside formal reservation boundaries.
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